A course program to learn about; The tragedy of the commons” science – growing artificial societies – experimental psychology vs experimental economics – Will rational people rebel against inequality?

Jeffrey Tucker

Reblogged from: http://sobek.colorado.edu/~mciverj/5108gt_syl.html

Week 1 Prerequisites: Rational Actors/Utility Theory

Required Readings:

Morrow, Chapters 1-2 + Appendix 1. An introduction to the basics of expected utility theory

G. Tsebelis (1989) “The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy” APSR 83: 77-91 An explanation of why expected utility calculations are inappropriate when probable states of the world are not exogenous but rather set by a strategic actor. Subject to reconsideration and critique in Week 9.

J. Orbell (1993) “Hamlet and the Psychology of Rational Choice under Uncertainty.” Rationality and Society, 127-140.

Week 2 Specifying a Game in Strategic/Normal Form

Required Readings:

Morrow, Chapter 3 Basic setup of extensive and normal form games.

R. Aumann (1987) “Game Theory” in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) The New Palgrave: Game Theory. New York: MacMillan/Norton. A history of major developments in game theory.

Week 3 Solution Concepts for Zero and Non-Zero Sum Games

Required Readings:

Morrow, Chapter 4

A, Rapoport and M. Guyer (1966) “A Taxonomy of 2 x 2 Games” General Systems 11: 203-214. Lays out all 78 possible 2×2 ordinal games in normal/strategic form.

Week 4 Normal Games In Political Science

Required Readings:

D. Baird et al (1994) Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Chapter 1)

V. Aggarwal (1996) Debt Games: Strategic Interactions in International Debt Rescheduling. NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 2-4.

J. Reed (1999) “A Game Theoretic Analysis of the US and China’s Economic Relations: How Political, Social, and Economic factors Affect the Payoff Matrix”, paper presented at the MPSA Annual Conference.

M. Lichbach (1990) “Will Rational People Rebel Against Inequality? Samson’s Choice.” AJPS 34: 1049-1076.

R. Clinton (1994) “Game Theory, Legal History and the Origins of Judicial Review: A Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v. Madison” AJPS 38: 285-302.

J. Bendor and T. Hammond (1992) “Rethinking Allison’s Models” APSR 86: 301-322.

E. Ostrom (1995) “Incentives, Rules of the Game and Development.” World Bank Conference on Developmental Economics.

Week 5 Extensive Form Games: Solution Concepts I

Required Readings:

Morrow, Chapters 5-7

Alternative Readings on Solutions to Extensive Form Games esp. Games with Incomplete Information

P. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory, NY: Cambridge, 1984, Chapter 3.

P. Ordeshook, A Political Theory Primer, NY: Routledge, 1992, Chapter 5.

K. Binmore, Fun and Games, Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1992, Chapters 10-11.

Background:

C. Holt and L. Anderson (1996) “Classroom Games: Understanding Bayes’ Rule” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 10 (2): 179-187.

S. Salop (1987) “Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1 (3): 155-160.

Week 6 Extensive Games in Political Science

Required Readings:

G. Hardin (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons” Science. 162: 1243-1248.

E. Ostrom (1990) Governing the Commons. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

M. Golden (1997) Heroic Defeats: The Politics of Job Loss. NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-2

T. Sullivan (1990) “Bargaining with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence.” APSR 84: 1167-1195.

G. Tsebelis (1990) Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Chapter 5

Week 7 Extensive Form Games: Solution Concepts II “Theory of Moves”

Required Readings:

S. Brams, Theory of Moves, Chapters 1-5

Week 8 Limited Information Games

Required Readings:

J. Morrow, Chapter 8

S. Brams, Theory of Moves, Chapters 6-7

R. Leng (1988) “Crisis Learning Games” APSR 82: 179-194.

Week 9 Repeated Games

Required Readings:

J. Morrow, Chapter 9

R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books (Chapters 1-3, Appendices A & B)

V. Vanberg and R. Congleton (1992) “Rationality, Morality and Exit.” APSR 86: 418-431.

W. Bianco and R. Bates (1990) “Cooperation by Design: Leadership , Structure and Collective Decisions” APSR 84: 133-147.

W. Bianco, P. Ordeshook and G. Tsebelis (1990) “Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two Person Games Enough?” (Controversy) APSR 84: 569-586.

Week 10 N-Person Games I

Required Readings:

Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation

P. Ordeshook, A Political Theory Primer, NY: Routledge, 1992, Chapter 6.

P. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory, NY: Cambridge, 1984, Chapters 7-9.

Week 11 N-Person Games II

Required Readings:

J. Orbell and L. A. Wilson (1978)Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners Dilemma.” APSR 72: 411-421

E. Niou and P. Ordeshook (1990) “Stability in Anarchic International Systems.” APSR 84 (4): 1207-1234.

R. Karklins and R. Petersen (1993) “Decision Calculus of Protestors and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989.” JOP 588-614.

B. Hinckley (1981) Coalitions and Politics. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich

D. Rohde and H. Spaeth (1976) Supreme Court Decision Making. San Francisco: W H Freeman (Chapter 9)

L. Epstein and J. Knight (1998) The Choices Justices Make. Washington DC: CQ Press.

R. Axelrod (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent Based Models of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

J. Epstein and R. Axtell (1995) Growing Artificial Societies. Washington DC: Brookings.

W. Riker (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.

W. Eskridge (1991) “Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game.” 79 California Law Review 644.

318397_296893870328679_1594498168_n

Week 12 Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Problem/Prediction Failures

Required Readings:

J. Morrow, Chapter 10

R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books (Chapters 4-9)

J. Goeree and C. Holt (1999) “Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contraditions”

C. Camerer (1997) “Progress in Behavioral Game Theory.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 11: 167-188.

A. Rubinstein (1999) “Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Postclass Problem Sets as Didactic Device.” Game and Economic Behavior. 28: 150-170.

Week 13 Behavioral Game Theory: Experimental Methods/Psychology vs. Economics

Required Readings:

D. Friedman and S. Sunder (1994) Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. New York: Cambridge University Press. (esp. Chapter 9. “The Emergence of Experimental Economics”)

V. Smith (1989) “Theory, Experimental and Economics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives.

D. Davis and C. Holt (1993) Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (esp. Chapters 1, 2 and 9)

M. Rabin (1998) “Psychology and Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature 36: 11-46 (Norlin REF)

J. Elster (1998) “Emotions and Economic Theory” Journal of Economic Literature 36: 47-74.

S. Bowles (1998) “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions.” Journal of Economic Literature 36: 75-111. <

P. Lunt (1996) “Rethinking the Relationship between Economics and Psychology.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 17: 275-

C. Holt (1995) “Psychology and Economics” ASSA Annual Meeting

H. Simon (1985) “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science.” APSR 79: 293-304

A. Tversky and D. Kahneman (1986) “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions” Journal of Business. 59: S251-S278.

M. Flood, K. Lendenmann and A. Rapoport (1983) “2×2 Games Played by Rats: Different Delays of Reinforcment as Payoffs” Behavioral Science 28: 65-78. (AKA “rats are people too”.)

Week 14 Behavioral Game Theory: Altruism/Fairness, Gender Differences

Required Readings:

M. Rabin (1993) “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics.” American Economic Review 83: 1281-1302.

R. Forsythe et al. (1994) “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior. 6: 347-369.

E. Hoffman et al. (1994) “Preference, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 7: 346-380.

C. Eckel and P. Grossman (1996) “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games” Games and Economic Behavior. 16: 181-191 (available electronically/Norlin)

C. Eckel and P. Grossman (1998) “Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Games” The Economic Journal. 108: 726-735.

C. Eckel and R. Wilson (1998) “The Human Face of Game Theory.” (working paper)

C. Eckel and R. Wilson (1999) “The Human Face of Game Theory: Trust and Reciprocity in Sequential Games.” (working paper)

C. Eckel and R. Wilson (1999) “Why Fairness? Facial Expressions, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emergence of Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games.” (paper presented at the 1999 Workshop on the Workshop II conference, Bloomington, IN)

Week 15 Linking Behavioral Game Theory to Political Science Phenomena

Required Readings:

R. Wilson (1986) “Forward and Backward Agenda Procedures: Committee Experiments on Structurally Induced Equilibrium.” JOP 48: 390-409.

Week 16 Critiques of Rational Actor Theories (and the Response)

Required Readings:

D. Green and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, Chapter 1-3

S. Lohmann, “The Poverty of Green and Shapiro”

TUESDAY DECEMBER 8TH IS THE LAST CLASS MEETING.

Advertisements

~ by blombladivinden on December 3, 2012.

3 Responses to “A course program to learn about; The tragedy of the commons” science – growing artificial societies – experimental psychology vs experimental economics – Will rational people rebel against inequality?”

  1. This is an amazing information! Thanks for sharing, I have to check some of the main theoretical models…

  2. It is also an amazing awful education system, teaching humans to invade, steal and enslave other people’s lives – it is actually a question of sophisticated warfare.

    How about a lifestyle without governments steering global governmentality? Everybody is looking for happiness and freedom … since it is gone a long time ago …

    Complaints from “the opposite side” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=416740

  3. WHERE HAVE ALL THE FLOWERS GONE? – PETE SEEGER

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s

 
%d bloggers like this: